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ABSTRACT
Wireless networks employ many forms of single and multiple authentication
techniques (many of which may be combined) to support both different types of devices
and strong authentication methods. However, there are times when such strong methods
may not be used (when, for example, devices such as Internet of things (IoT) devices, voice
over Internet Protocol (VoIP) phones, etc. do not allow user input or the installation of a
certificate) and a weaker method (such as a Wi-Fi Protected Access Pre-Shared Key (WPAPSK)) may be selected. In such cases, Multi-factor authentication (MFA), leveraging outof-band (OOB) communication, could be employed to increase the authentication security
level. Accordingly, techniques are presented herein that support a new method for wireless
client authentication – which may be referred to herein as WPA-PSK + OOB authentication
– that combines the easy configuration that is provided by a WPA-PSK with the strong
authentication that is provided by an MFA infrastructure.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION
Currently, wireless networks employ numerous forms of single and multiple
authentication methods, many of which may be combined. Among other things, wireless
networks need to support both different types of devices and strong authentication methods
(such as the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) standard 802.1X).
However, there may be times when such strong authentication methods cannot be used
because some of the devices (such as Internet of things (IoT) devices, voice over Internet
Protocol (VoIP) phones, etc.) may not allow user input or the installation of a certificate.
As a result, many times a Wi-Fi Protected Access Pre-Shared Key (WPA-PSK)
authentication method may be chosen. However, such a selection considerably reduces the
authentication security level.
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Multi-factor authentication (MFA) may be employed to increase the authentication
security level in many applications and could also be used by wireless local area networks
(WLANs) to improve security.
Using MFA combined with a WPA-PSK could take advantage of a simple Layer 2
(L2) authentication (where no certificate or user input are required on a device), but still
provide a strong authentication method occurring out-of-band (OOB).
Accordingly, techniques are presented herein that support a new wireless
authentication method – OOB authentication – that, among other things, leverages the
already existing MFA infrastructure.
Figure 1, below, illustrates elements of MFA in a wireless network according to
aspects of the techniques presented herein and reflective of the discussion that was
presented above.

Figure 1: Exemplary MFA in a Wireless Network
As depicted in Figure 1, above, when a station (which is identified as STA in the
figure) wishes to connect to a wireless network, MFA may be completed through the use
of a preregistered user device (which is identified as MFA Client in the figure). The STA
may associate with a new authentication method combining a Pre-Shared Key
(PSK)(such as a shared passphrase) and OOB authentication (relying on the MFA
infrastructure).
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Figure 2, below, depicts elements of an exemplary sequence diagram, according
to aspects of the techniques presented herein, for the new authentication method that was
described above (which may be referred to herein as WPA-PSK + OOB authentication).

Figure 2: Sequence Diagram for WPA-PSK + OOB Authentication
The sequence diagram that is presented in Figure 2, above, identifies a series of
steps. Those steps, which are labeled 1 through 13 in the figure, will be described below.
During Step 1, a user configures WPA-PSK + OOB authentication on their client
(i.e., the supplicant) which is identified as STA in the figure. In addition to the PSK
parameters, a username may also be entered. During Step 2, WPA-PSK + OOB
authentication is selected as the WLAN security approach on the Authenticator, and, under
Step 3, a Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service (RADIUS) policy is configured for
the given WLAN to use MFA authentication. At Step 4, the client connects to the
Authenticator and PSK authentication takes place. During Step 5, if PSK authentication is
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successful then the client may be held in a new OOB Authentication Pending state. In such
a state, the client can only send and receive Action Frames for delivering a userid.
During Step 6, the Authenticator retrieves the userid from the supplicant through
dedicated Action Frames after which, at Step 7, the Authenticator sends an Access-Request
(containing the userid) to the RADIUS server. The OOB authentication method may be
known by the RADIUS server through rules that are configured for the WLAN (which is a
preferred method). Alternatively, such information may be sent in an attribute-value pair
(AVP) in the Access-Request.
During Step 8, the RADIUS server receives the request and sends the authentication
request to the MFA server after which, at Step 9, the MFA server contacts the registered
user MFA client based on the received userid. In the instant scenario, it is assumed that
the userid as well as the method for performing the MFA are already known by the MFA
server.
During Step 10, the user (through the MFA client) performs the MFA. At Step 11,
the MFA server sends the authentication response to the RADIUS server where, at Step 12,
the RADIUS server sends an Access-Accept or an Access-Reject to the Authenticator with
a new AVP. Finally, at Step 13 the Authenticator allows the client to transition to a run
state through which the client may now access the network.
Table 1, below, presents several new RADIUS AVPs according to aspects of the
techniques presented herein and reflective of the above discussion.
Table 1: New RADIUS AVPs
Message
Type
Access
Request
Access
Request
Access
Reject

Attribute
Type
Vendorspecific
attribute (VSA)
VSA/Standard
Standard

Name/Key
Oob

Authentication method identifier

Userid

String containing userid

WLAN Reason
Code

New authentication failure reason code
“MFA Unspecified Failure” and “MFA
Timeout” having a format that is defined in
Section 2.13 of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF) Request for Comments
(RFC) 7268
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Table 2, below, presents two new Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
(IEEE) technical standard 802.11 reason codes according to aspects of the techniques
presented herein and reflective of the above discussion.
Table 2: New IEEE 802.11 Reason Codes
Name
MFA_UNSPECIFIED_FAILURE
MFA_NO_RESPONSE

Meaning
MFA failure either due to invalid method or token
Client not responding for a given timeout for MFA

As described and illustrated in the above narrative, the techniques presented herein
employ MFA to provide for an increased security level, while still benefiting from the
simple configuration of a PSK, by leveraging the existing wireless and MFA infrastructure
during device authentication and without requiring any additional applications or tokens.
According to aspects of the techniques presented herein, the OOB authentication
approach that was described above may be extended to other authentication methods that,
for example, already employ a RADIUS server. For example, IEEE 802.1X (dot1x)-based
or web-based authentication could increase their security level by adding an OOB
authentication with the MFA infrastructure.
In connection with the techniques presented herein, it is important to note that an
Authenticator-RADIUS exchange (as depicted in Figure 2, above) does not require any
change. The RADIUS server requires that the WLAN profile be configured to perform an
additional MFA step. Because MFA requires user input, the authentication will take a
considerably longer time. As a result, this implies that the Authenticator timeout for a
RADIUS response will need to be adjusted accordingly.
Further, media access control (MAC) Authentication Bypass (MAB) could also
make use of the above-described OOB authentication mechanism. In such a case, it would
be necessary to create a new database containing a device identifier, along with a user that
is associated with same, so that the MFA server may determine (based on a device identifier)
to which user the MFA process should be directed. A device identifier may be a device’s
MAC address or it may be some other identifier that is sufficiently robust in light of
randomized changing MAC mechanisms.
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In summary, techniques have been presented that support a new method for wireless
client authentication – which may be referred to herein as WPA-PSK + OOB authentication
– that combines the easy configuration that is provided by WPA-PSK with the strong
authentication that is provided by an MFA infrastructure.
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